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Abstract 
This paper examines to what extent financial performance (FP) represents one of the main 
determinants for tone disclosure (TD) in Egyptian annual reports. We also measure the 
bidirectional relationship between TD and FP. We use the manual content analysis to measure 
levels of TD in annual reports for a sample of 105 firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. Our 
sample covers a three-year period (2011–2013). Our descriptive analysis shows that Egyptian firms 
disclose more good news than bad news. Therefore, the net news disclosure, or net variances, 
between good/bad is positive. The empirical analysis shows a positive association between the 
narrative disclosure of good/bad news and FP based on return on assets (ROA). We also find a 
highly significant association between the auditor, profitability, leverage, firm growth and financial 
reporting of good/bad news information. Finally, the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression show that the causality between the two endogenous variables runs from FP to TD . 
Thus, TD is determined by FP. We offer a novel contribution to disclosure studies by being the 
first study to examine tone disclosure in one of the developing countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The goal of our paper is to examine the impact of financial performance (FP) on tone disclosure 
(TD). We  also examine the impact of TD on FP. Although the association between disclosure 
and firm performance has received major interests in accounting research, the findings are always 
mixed (e.g. Baek et al. 2004). In addition, none of prior research has examined the bidirectional 
relationship between TD and FP in developing countries, particularly in Egypt.  
 
We are motivated to focus on the Egyptian context for several reasons. One reason is the rapid 
growth of Egypt as an emerging economy with noteworthy foreign investment potential (Elsayed 
and Hoque, 2010). Egypt has a diverse financial reporting environment that might affect initial 
disclosure requirements differently. According to Gray’s (1988) model, accounting measures and 
disclosures in Egypt will tend to be more conservative and less transparent. There is a need for 
Egypt to raise capital and promote confidence as well as take stakeholders into consideration . The 
Egyptian environment has been dynamic, growing through different economic and political 
systems that arguably affected accounting disclosure practices. Egypt is one of the countries that 
was affected by the Arab Spring based on the 25 January revolution. Hence, Egypt provides an 
opportunity for empirical research to gain insights into the impacts of political crisis regarding the 
extent of disclosure. Moreover, Egypt is used as an example of a major developing economy in 
the Middle East and North Africa regions, which is generally overlooked in prior research 
(Ebrahim and Abdel Fattah, 2015).  
 
Whereas prior research has extensively analysed the impact of TD on FP and stock price (e.g. 
Hutton et al., 2003), this paper provides evidence of the same association and the reverse 
relationship: FP affects TD. Using a sample of 105 Egyptian listed firms during the period 2011–
2013, we found evidence that good news disclosure is positively associated with firms’ FP, 
suggesting that Egyptian firms that report more positive news achieve a higher FP. Our result 
supports the argument TD contains value relevant information.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature and 
develops the research hypotheses; Section 3 presents the research design; Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Disclosure Theories, Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
The impact of FP on TD 
 
Agency theory proposes that managers of profitable firms disclose more information to magnify 
their success and to increase investors’ confidence in the management of firms. Managers might 
wish to encourage positive impressions using management impression techniques to attract many 
parties, such as potential lenders and investors. It also suggests that managers of profitable firms 
disclose more information to boost their compensation (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). However, 
management might disclose less information because of loss or lower profitability, as managers 
want to be vague about such poor FP results (Wang et al., 2008). Moreover, signalling theory 
recommends that profitable firms have an incentive to disclose more information, to signal the 
firm’s FP to investors to support continuation of management’s positions (Oyeler et al. 2003). 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) argued that extreme changes in FP can affect the thematic content 
of the narrative disclosure, such as the chairman’s statement. Clatworthy and Jones (2001) found 
that profitable firms are more inclined to discuss their results and acquisitions and disposals, while 
unprofitable firms include more discussion of board changes. Clarke (1997: p. 36) found that 
“firms with negative results do divert attention away from themselves by referring to the 
environment, target markets and emotive words rather than firms’ actions and performance 
indicators”. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) found that good FP presents more good news than bad 
news, as measured by overall words and keywords, and bad FP does not dwell on bad news. Prior 
research identifies that the writing style adopted by firms in the chairman’s statement is contingent 
on FP. For instance, Sydserff and Weetman (2002) found that the narratives of firms experiencing 
poor FP are written in a style which detaches the reader from the message.  
 
Profitability is central to the discussion of corporate disclosure. More profitable firms will be able 
to support the cost of information production and dissemination and, therefore, will be in a 
position to disclose more information. Inchausti (1997) revealed that profitability is capable of 
influencing the extent to which firms disclose information in their annual reports. Ismail and 
Chandler (2005) found a positive association between disclosure and FP. It should be noted that 
empirical results do not always confirm a positive relationship (Garcı´a-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003). 
In the context of the agency and political cost theories, Ng and Koh (1994) pointed out the fact 
that profitable firms are more exposed to political pressure and public scrutiny, and use more self-
regulating mechanisms to avoid regulation. Singhvi and Desai (1971) claimed that, when a firm’s 
FP is high, managers are motivated to disclose detailed information to support their positions. 
This positive correlation between a firm’s FP and corporate disclosure is also implied by the 
theoretical model of voluntary disclosure in the face of adverse selection. The firm is likely to 
disclose more frequently when it is experiencing favourable earnings results and earnings forecasts 
are associated with positive returns. Chiu and Wang (2015) examined determinants of corporate 
reporting by using a sample of 246 listed firms in Taiwan. They demonstrated that measures of 
stakeholder power, strategic posture, economic resources, firm size and media visibility are related 
to corporate disclosure. Cho et al. (2010) found that firms that are more profitable tend to use 
more positive language in their disclosures or decisive language. The literature’s research results 
on profitability as a determinant of disclosure appear inconclusive (Street and Gray, 2002). Aras et 
al. (2010) did not find any association between FP and disclosure. Oeyono et al. (2011) found a 
positive association between both variables. Further, a few studies have asserted that there is a 
negative association between disclosures and FP (Rahman et al., 2011). Management appears to 
elaborate on positive FP in the narrative sections, such as the chairman’s statement, but prefers to 
communicate poor FP more concisely. Nevertheless, this paper argues that good FP is a good 
incentive for more disclosure, particularly good news, as profitable firms have better stories to tell 
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and are more able to afford the cost of disclosure. We proxy FP with ROA and anticipate a 
statistically positive relationship between the proxy and TD. Therefore, we hypothesise that 
 
H1. There is a relationship between TD and FP.   
 
The impact of TD on FP 
 
Empirical results on disclosure are commonly consistent with finance-theory predictions that more 
public information improves a firm’s value by decreasing the firm’s cost of capital (Hassan et al., 
2009). Lambert et al. (2007) argued that increased disclosure may affect a firm’s value by increasing 
the actual cash flows stockholders accrue as a result of lessening agency problems. Theoretical 
models of disclosure assume that managers maximise their firm’s stock price and conclude that 
when a higher price can be obtained by withholding the news, managers will abstain from 
disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983). Ayers et al. (2011) showed that, following good news, shares 
outperform immediately after the announcement. Skinner (1994) found that bad news disclosures 
generate larger stock price reactions than good news. Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014) showed 
that narrative reduces market uncertainty about future earnings and increases the credibility of 
financial statements. Managers pursuing stockholder wealth maximisation will only disclose news 
likely to increase share prices. Lev and Penman (1990) provided evidence that US firms are more 
likely to disclose good news than bad with respect to earnings disclosures. They supported the 
‘good news hypothesis’, that good news firms make more disclosures than bad news firms to 
achieve benefits, such as a reduction in information asymmetry and a lower cost of capital. 
Dedman and Lin (2002) found that only half of their sample of CEO departures were announced 
to the regulatory news service, even though this was proved by the share price reactions to the 
release of this information by the financial press. Miller (2002) documented a positive association 
between share price/earnings performance and disclosure. Good/bad news is also associated with 
abnormal returns at the time of an earnings announcement (Francis et al., 2002). These researchers 
stated that firms with higher disclosure scores exhibit higher levels regarding the share-price 
anticipation of future earnings than firms with lower disclosure scores. Schleicher and Walker 
(2010) found that loss-making firms provide a more positive tone, while firms with an earnings 
decline provide a more negative tone. Hassan et al. (2009) stated that disclosure is a mechanism to 
mitigate agency costs arising from the possibility that managers may not act in the best interest of 
shareholders. The investors’ business comprehension increases with disclosure and thus enhances 
the firms’ value. Mechanisms of disclosure allowing investors to upsurge their ability in firm 
monitoring then increase FP. Clarkson et al. (2008) documented a positive association between 
disclosure and firm’s value. Consistent with signalling theory, management, when in possession of 
‘good news’ due to better FP, is more likely to disclose more detailed information to the stock 
market than that provided by ‘bad news’ firms, to avoid the undervaluation of their shares. 
Empirical research offer mixed outcomes. For instance, Francis et al. (1994) found no evidence of 
announcement-day market returns being associated with the tone of press coverage in the year 
prior to the adverse announcement. In contrast, Davis et al. (2012) found that narrative disclosure 
is associated with abnormal returns. Smith and Taffler (2000) showed that narrative disclosures 
based on the content of the chairman’s statement are associated with FP. Thus, we expect a 
positive effect of TD on FP.  
 
H2. The relationship between TD and FP is bidirectional. 
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3. Research Design 
 
Sample selection 
 
Our sample is a balanced panel data of 105 firms listed on the Egyptian stock market during the 
three-year period 2011–2013. Our final data set comprises 315 firm-year observations. Given the 
existence of both cross-sectional and time-series information, we were able to use panel-data 
analysis. The explanatory and control variables data are collected from OSIRIS and Datastream. 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange website also provided relevant data, such as: industry classifications 
and fundamental information for all listed firms. Annual reports were purchased from the 
Egyptian stock market. The annual reports were in Arabic, so counting the sentences of good news 
and bad news was carried out manually. For consistency and reliability, a sample of the annual 
reports was given to an Egyptian colleague to read and count the sentences of good and bad news, 
to ensure the results we obtained were accurate.  
 
Research variables and model 
 
Dependent variable (TD) 
 
We count the number of good news statements and bad news statements, and then we calculate 
net news based on the variances between good and bad news information. To test the validity of 
our disclosure measure, we gave a sample of the annual reports to an Egyptian professional to read 
and count the sentences of good and bad news, to make sure that our score is valid.  
 
Measurement of independent and control variables 
 
We use Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure for firm performance. We consider seven control 
variables: firm size (Hackston and Milne, 1996); audit quality (Francis, 2004); industry sector (Dye 
and Sridhar, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005); leverage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); firm age 
(Muttakin and Khan, 2014); liquidity (Wallace and Naser, 1995); firm growth (Khurana et al., 2006).  
     
Empirical model 
 
For first stage of this study, which focused on the impacts of ROA on TD; we specify three models: 
in the first model we use good news as a dependent, in the second model we use bad news as a 
dependent and in the third model we use net news. Following preceding narrative disclosure 
studies (e.g. Ressas and Hussainey, 2014), we use the following OLS regression models: 
 
𝐆𝐍𝐃𝐢𝐭 = β0 + 𝛃𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭  +  β2 LIQit + β3 LEVit + β4 F. GROWit + β5 SIZEit +
β6 SECTit + β7 AGE+ β8 AUDITit +  ɛit                                                                   (𝟏)                                                                             
 
𝐁𝐍𝐃𝐢𝐭 = β0 + 𝛃𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 +  β2 LIQit + β3 LEVit + β4 F. GROWit + β5 SIZEit +
β6 SECTit + β7 AGE+ β8 AUDITit +  ɛit                                                            (2) 
  
𝑵𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹. 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐺𝐸+ 𝛽8 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖𝑡                                                           (𝟑)            
 
Where GND = good news disclosure; BND = bad news disclosure; NND = net news disclosure; ROA: 
return on assets; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm is audited by one of the four big auditor offices or 0 
otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: 
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leverage (total debts to total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: 
category of each sector.   
 
For the second stage of this study, which focused on the value relevance of tone disclosure on a 
firm’s performance, measured by ROA, we specify three additional models, as follows: 
 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑮𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹. 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐺𝐸+ β8 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖𝑡                            (𝟒) 
 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑩𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹. 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐺𝐸+ 𝛽8 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + ɛ𝑖𝑡                            (𝟓) 
 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = β0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑵𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + β4 LEVit + β5 F. GROWit
+ β6 SECTORit + β7 AGE+ β8 AUDITit + ɛit                             (𝟔) 
 
Where GND = good news disclosure; BND = bad news disclosure; NND = net news disclosure; ROA: 
return on assets;  AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm is audited by one of the four big auditor offices or 0 
otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: 
leverage (total debts to total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: 
category of each sector. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 shows that the average narrative disclosure for good news, bad news and net news is 3.6; 
1.6 and 1.9, respectively. The profitability ratio varies between firms, with a minimum level of -
0.77 and a maximum level of 0.37. The average ROA for our selected firms is 0.05. Thirty-two per 
cent of the listed Egyptian firms are audited by one of the big four audit firms. The average age of 
our selected firms is 34.6 years. The mean liquidity during the three years is 5.39, while the average 
leverage is 40%. On average, the firm size (SIZE) is 8.273 million, with a minimum of 4.65 million 
and a maximum of 10.34 million. Our sample is drawn from a diverse range of industries, including 
telecommunications, manufacture and exports/imports. The average growth rate is -53.75, with a 
maximum value of 1. 
 
Table 2 shows net news disclosure is positively correlated with ROA and size. However, the net 
news disclosure score is negatively correlated with leverage. Observations in the correlation matrix 
show that all of the correlation coefficients are below 80%. This indicates that there is no evidence 
of multicollinearity problems (Hair et al., 2010). Tables 3 and 4 show that VIF does not exceed 
more than two. Therefore, there is no multicollinearity problem between independent variables.  
 
(Insert Tables 1&2 here)  
 
Table 3 shows the impact of FP on TD. For model 1, where the good news serves as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient of good news is positive and also statistically significant, with the ROA at 
5%. For model 2, where the bad news serves as the dependent variable, the coefficient is negative 
and also statistically significant, with the ROA at 10%. For model 3, where the net news serves as 
the dependent variable, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, with the ROA at 1%. 
Therefore, as predicted in hypothesis H1, a firm’s likelihood of disclosing its good news is 
positively associated with its FP, as reported in model 1. Thus, hypothesis H1 is accepted. The 
positive effect of FP on disclosure is consistent with signalling theory, which proposes that 
managers of profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information in their annual reports 
to justify their remunerations and to signal their superior performance to the market (Wallace et 
al. 1994). This means that profitable firms provide more positive good news than loss-making 
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firms. In other words, profitable firms disclose good news information in their narratives to send 
a positive signal to all stakeholders. Our findings are also consistent with Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003) and Schleicher and Walker (2010).  
 
With regard to the control variables, our results support the suggestions that leverage is negatively 
significant with disclosure, as reported in models 1 and 3. We also find a negative association 
between liquidity as well as firm growth and good news, at the 10% level. Regarding the role of 
the external auditor, we find a negative association between auditors and bad news, at the 10% 
level. For other variables, we could not find any significant association between size, sector and 
firm age towards narrative disclosure in the three models. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Table 4 shows the impact of TD on FP. For model 4, where we measure the impacts of good news 
on the FP, the result is both positive and significant, at the 10% level. This means that, when a 
firm discloses good news about its activities, ROA is growing. The reverse association approved 
in model 5 identifies that the disclosure of bad news has a negative impact on the firm’s 
performance, or ROA, at the 10% level. For model 6, we find that net news has a positive impact 
on ROA, at the 1% level. Thus, we conclude that tone disclosure has an impact on FP. Also, 
models 4, 5 and 6 investigate hypothesis H2, that is, whether the narrative good and bad news 
disclosure of a firm has a favourable influence on the FP. Hypothesis H2 is accepted, as shown in 
our three models. This result conforms to the traditional view that more information adds value 
to firms. Our results are consistent with signalling theory and relevant literature (i..e. Drobetz et 
al., 2004), who determined that firms with better disclosure practices are associated with a higher 
FP. The effect is not only statistically significant, but its magnitude is also considerable from an 
economic point of view. 
 
The positive effect of TD on FP shows that disclosing more good information leads to a higher 
FP. This indicates that increasing good news information reduce information asymmetry and 
results in a reduction in both monitoring and capital costs (Cheung et al., 2010). Moreover, an 
higher level of disclosure improves management accountability and hence the firm value. Investors 
are more likely to evaluate the performance of these firms more highly, and this increases 
investment interest and a firm’s performance. On the other hand, the analytical accounting models 
challenge the traditional sight of disclosure effects. Wagenhofer (2004) argued that the effects of 
disclosure depend on uncertainty, multi-person settings with conflicts of interest and information 
asymmetry. Thus, it is possible to expect a negative relationship between increased TD and FP. 
For instance, more public disclosure might reduce the acquisition of information by market 
participants, and thus decrease the total amount of information available in the capital market. 
More public information might also have negative net benefits if the information places a firm at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals. These results emphasise that the association 
between FP and disclosure is complex and depends on the interaction of a number of factors, such 
as category of disclosure and the context in which this association is examined. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here)  
 
To conclude, our findings support our hypotheses that there is an association between FP and TD. 
Consequently, this suggests that the narrative disclosure is determined by their FP. This proposes 
that the causality between the two endogenous variables runs from FP to TD and from TD to FP. 
Our findings are consistent with recent research by Farag et al. (2014), who provided evidence 
about the positive direction between disclosure and FP. Our findings show that high-profitable 
firms report more good news and less bad news in the narrative sections of annual reports. The 
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study found that variances between good and bad news were positive during the three years, which 
reflects that Egyptian firms between 2011 and 2013 disclose good news more than bad news. 
However, Beekes et al. (2015) argued that firms generally have increased their disclosure frequency 
and demonstrated an improvement in the timeliness of bad news relative to good news, indicating 
a levelling of disclosure practices and greater transparency. Our result may be explained by the 
political situation after the 25 January revolution, which enhanced the market situation and 
attracted investors. This justification supports the argument about the effect of crisis on financial 
reporting. Our findings are consistent with Keusch et al. (2012:623), who found that “a crisis 
situation leads to more extensive use of self-serving bias as adverse external economic conditions 
are used by managers to present themselves in the best possible light”. However, our findings are 
inconsistent with Ressas and Hussainey (2014), who provided evidence that, in a crisis period, 
firms report more bad news and less good news information. This might indicate that managers 
offer credible information at a time of crisis. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) showed that firms prefer 
to use bad news disclosure to blame the external environment rather than an economic or political 
crisis. Moreover, the evidence about the positive variances of good/bad news by Egyptian firms 
is consistent with the idea that managers face an asymmetric loss function in choosing their 
voluntary disclosure policies. Managers behave as if they bear large costs when investors are 
surprised by large negative earnings news, but not when other earnings news is announced.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We offer evidence on the the bidirectional association between TD and FP We add to the scarce 
evidence on TD in developing countries. We extend prior research, which mainly focus on one 
direction, to measuring the bidirection between FP and discloaure. 
 
 We provide evidence that Egyptian firms tend to benefit from greater good news disclosure. Our 
results may help regulators to adopt an appropriate balance of legislation, regulatory reform and 
enforcement to make improvements in the good and bad disclosure practices as well as the 
enhancement of organisational legitimacy. While previous research showed that analysts and 
investors rely on annual report narratives for decision making, these statements remain largely 
unregulated and unaudited. The study will be of value to academic researchers in the field of 
impression management and to users of annual reports who may rely on narrative sections, such 
as the chairman’s statement, for decision making. 
 
We focus only on annual reports. Future research may consider other financial communication 
channels. We focus only on Egyptian firms. However, we believe that the same hypotheses are 
worth testing outside Egypt, and that it is reasonable to expect a higher level of tone management 
disclosure in other countries with better investor protection and with more developed capital 
markets. While this study used ROA as an accounting measure for performance, further research 
may use Tobin’s Q or other market-based measure of performance. Future research may also 
examine the impact of the Arab Spring on the association between TD and FP.  Finally, it might 
be interesting to test the association between TD and FP before and after political crises such as 
the Arab Spring.  
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Table 1: Descriptive analysis  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
G.N 313 0.00 22.00 3.600 4.75256 1.677 2.346 
B.N 313 0.00 24.00 1.648 2.91731 3.210 15.064 
NET.N 315 -15.00 20.00 1.939 4.79844 0.739 2.413 
ROA 390 -0.77 0.37 0.053 0.10679 -2.099 17.587 
AUDIT 314 0.00 1.00 0.324 0.46906 0.752 -1.444 
SIZE 390 4.65 10.34 8.273 1.21619 -1.072 0.818 
LIQ 390 0.11 304.53 5.39 20.842 9.819 12.514 
LEV 390 0.00 1.95 0.40 0.258 1.345 5.422 
F.GROW 383 -424.58 1.00 -53.75 367.80 -9.275 94.813 
SECT 379 1.00 16.00 5.910 4.283 1.123 -0.032 
AGE 322 1.00 123.00 34.66 20.92 1.667 4.017 
Variable definition: G.N: Good news; B.N: Bad news; NET.N: (Net news) The difference between good and bad news; 
ROA: return on assets; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE:  
natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to total assets); 
F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: category of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals and 
telecommunication) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the continuous independent variables 
  NET.N ROA AUDIT SIZE LIQ LEV F.GROW SECT AGE 
12 | P a g e  
 
NET.N 1 0.354** 0.055 0.127* -0.027 -0.206** -0.087 -0.024 -0.096 
ROA 0.311** 1 0.024 .245** -0.020 -.483** -0.013 -0.029 -.120* 
AUDIT 0.109 0.057 1 .389** -.118* .141* -0.003 -.238** .154* 
SIZE 0.140* 0.142** 0.416** 1 -0.070 -.151** -.125* 0.005 -0.101 
LIQ 0.208** 0.341** -.194** -.177** 1 -.287** -0.003 .105* -.183** 
LEV -0.162** -.285** 0.194** 0.072 -.730** 1 0.020 -.177** .180** 
F.GROW -0.006 0.015 -0.037 -.332** 0.090 -0.085 1 -0.020 -0.062 
SECT -0.034 -0.100 -.319** -.125* .107* -.127* -0.040 1 -0.044 
AGE -0.149* 0.027 0.148* -.114* -.131* 0.086 0.067 -0.092 1 
Variable definition: NET.N: (net news) The difference between good and bad news; ROA: return on assets; Auditor: dummy 
code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity 
(current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE:  
age of the firm; SECT: category of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals and telecommunication); (*) Statistical significance at 
10% level; (**) Statistical significance at 5% level; (***) Statistical significance at 1% level   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Impact of financial performance on disclosure quality  
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  
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 Good news Bad news Net news VIF1 
Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat 
Constant  1.959  2.544  0.362  
ROA 0.208 3.074** -0.113 -1.915* 0.273 4.086*** 1.199 
LIQ -0.113 -1.657* -0.084 -1.587 -0.049 -0.732 1.219 
LEV -0.163 -2.274* -0.002 -0.040 -0.123 -1.731* 1.351 
F.GROW -0.114 -1.839* -0.026 -0.522 -0.091 -1.484 1.018 
SIZE -0.012 -0.173 -0.061 -1.092 0.050 0.742 1.202 
SECT 0.069 1.071 0.066 1.271 0.023 0.357 1.099 
AGE -0.060 -0.920 0.029 0.564 -0.076 -1.186 1.114 
AUDIT -0.019 -0.271 -0.102 -1.852* 0.027 0.390 1.250 
YEAR dummy  Included  Included  Included   
Model Summary 
R Square 
F value  
P value   
 
0.122 
4.007 
0.000 
 
0.217 
2.399 
0.016 
 
0.143 
4.804 
0.000 
 
Variable definition: G.N: Good news; B.N: Bad news; NET.N: (Net news ), The difference between good and 
bad news; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE:  
natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to 
total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); ROA: return on assets; ROE: return on equity; AGE:  age 
of the company; SECT: category of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals and telecommunication); (*) Statistical 
significance at 10% level; (**) Statistical significance at 5% level; (***) Statistical significance at 1% level      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of disclosure quality on financial performance 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  
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 Good news Bad news Net news VIF 
Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat 
Constant  0.809  1.484  0.979  
G.N 0.134 3.141**     1.040 
B.N   -0.083 -1.915*   1.039 
NET.N     0.185 4.346*** 1.057 
LIQ -0.134 -2.994 -0.155 -3.462 -0.136 -3.081 1.132 
LEV -0.494 -10.696 -0.511 -11.096 -0.479 -10.449 1.209 
F.GROW 0.024 0.575 0.013 0.292 0.025 0.592 1.029 
SIZE 0.160 3.420 0.154 3.250 0.151 3.263 1.246 
SECT -0.105 -2.411 -0.097 -2.208 -0.096 -2.231 1.073 
AGE -0.016 -0.374 -0.020 -0.458 -0.010 -0.236 1.061 
AUDIT -0.007 -0.147 -0.017 -0.347 -0.018 -0.386 1.254 
YEAR dummy        Included Included          Included  
Model Summary 
R Square 
F value  
P value   
 
0.313 
22.234 
0.000 
 
0.302 
21.133 
0.000 
 
0.328 
23.836 
0.000 
 
Variable definition: G.N: Good news; B.N: Bad news; NET.N: (net news), The difference between good and bad 
news; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE:  natural 
logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to total 
assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); ROA: return on assets; AGE:  age of the company; SECT: category 
of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals and telecommunication); (*) Statistical significance at 10% level; (**) 
Statistical significance at 5% level; (***) Statistical significance at 1% level      
 
 
 
